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Abstract— The present work aims to offer a contribute for 
the evaluation of the opportunity to adopt strategies based on 
state support or, alternatively, on the managerial autonomy of 
local bodies in financial trouble. The research, after analyzing the 
main guidelines at European level and mentioning possible 
solutions currently laid down in Italian legislation, presents the 
results of an empirical investigation on the economic effects 
produced on the local economy by the collapse of the 
Municipality of Taranto. The choice of the city of Taranto is due 
both to the significant magnitude of the ascertained debt, which 
was one of the highest in the history of Italy, and to the 
considerable economic effects caused by the recovery procedure. 
Specifically, have been firstly examined the reasons which led  to 
the collapse of the local public authority and the main aspects 
characterizing the administrative management of the passive 
mass besides the possible solutions for the definitive 
implementation of the recovery plan. 
Keywords— local bodies, financial default 
 
I.  PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The theme of the crisis of the local authorities has not been 
deepened, in its various aspects, by the international and 
national doctrine, concerned mainly with analysing the 
dysfunctions of enterprises. 
Such a lack of interest is justified by the fact that, usually, 
the financial difficulties of local authorities are solved with 
extraordinary funding by the central government aimed at 
limiting the effects on citizens, local economies, and, 
indirectly, on the economy as whole. 
In literature, however, particular attention on the crisis of 
the local public administration has been reserved especially by 
Anglo-Saxon and north-European literature (from Sweden, 
Norway, Germany), where the issue of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public services management is a 
recognised, practiced and developed subject 1, 2. 
The most relevant doctrinal studies were directed mainly 
to investigate the causes of the crisis and its geographical and 
time distribution 3. 
That said, the aim of this research is to evaluate the 
opportunity to adopt strategies of state support or, 
alternatively, to leave to the local managerial autonomy the 
adoption of regeneration policies for local bodies in financial 
trouble. 
In order to usefully contribute to the discussion on the 
topic of state support vs. managerial autonomy, in this study, 
after analysing the main guidelines at European level and 
mentioning possible solutions currently laid down in Italian 
legislation, are presented the results of an empirical 
investigation on the economic effects produced on the local 
economy by the collapse of the Municipality of Taranto. 
The choice of the city of Taranto is due to both the 
significant magnitude of the ascertained debt, which was one 
of the highest in the history of Italy, and the significant 
economic effects caused by the lengthy rationalisation 
procedure, not yet concluded after about ten years. 
In this regard, have been firstly examined the 
administrative management of the passive mass and sought the 
reasons and possible solutions for the definitive 
implementation of the recovery plan. Secondly, with reference 
to the companies admitted to the passive mass, we determined 
the economic losses and the survival status of the companies 
involved in the insolvency procedure and resident in the local 
area of reference. 
In particular, this study aims to answer the following main 
research questions: 
- which strategies are most suitable for solving the 
financial crisis of the municipal administrations? 
- what are the reasons which led to the collapse the 
Municipality of Taranto? 
- what are its effects and possible solutions for its 
extinction?   
In terms of methodology, this study is characterized by a 
multiple approach 4. The first part of the work is descriptive-
informative 5 on the main institutional and doctrinal 
guidelines on State support vs autonomy in the management 
rationalisation of local authorities; the second part is 
experimental-inductive, with cognitive-interpretative purposes 
of the multi-faceted economic causal effects related to the 
phenomenon of financial collapse 6, 7, 8.  
In reference to this last part of analysis, the course of the 
research followed a bottom-up approach: firstly have been 
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examined the information derived data obtained from the 
official documentation, and subsequently the same have been 
observed and reprocessed to better describe and summarize 
the complexity of the economic phenomenon under 
investigation 9. 
At the operational level, in order to reply to the research 
questions a series of activities were planned, organized and 
coordinated. 
As first stage, have been acquired the resolutions of 
ascertainment of debts admitted to the insolvency procedure. 
This documentation, provided by the Extraordinary 
Liquidation Board (OSL) through the Chambers of Commerce 
of Taranto, dated from the beginning of the insolvency 
procedure (October 2006) to 30 September 2013.  
Subsequently, the applications for the admission to the 
passive mass have been grouped by number and amount, and 
separated into rejected applications, applications opened but 
not yet carried out, applications settled and unsettled due to 
rejected offerings. This procedure was intended to ensure, on a 
certain date, the total amount of liabilities and to define the 
number of already settled instances and the number of those 
still to be settled. 
Through the examination of applications eligible for the 
admission to the passive mass it was possible to determine the 
universe of investigation, which consisted of the holders of 
claims considered either eligible or ineligible by the OSL. 
The research results allow both to evaluate the 
convenience of the extraordinary financial support to relieve 
local economies in financial troubles, and to justify the 
introduction of the new legal institution of the multi-annual 
rebalancing, introduced in Italy by Law 213/2012, as an 
alternative to the insolvency procedure. 
Additional contributions of the study are the opportunity to 
encourage a responsible behaviour based on the efficiency of 
public administrations, and the quantification of the economic 
damage caused by the default of a public administration. 
 
II. THE EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT OF THE FINANCIAL 
COLLAPSE OF LOCAL BODIES: STATE SUPPORT OR MANAGERIAL 
AUTONOMY 
 
The current economic crisis that hit the economies of many 
Western countries, including Italy, inevitably affected the 
policies of state budget and public spending of the various 
local governments, with significant consequences on their 
already precarious financial conditions 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14. 
In many UE and non-EU countries, including Italy, in 
order to promote a greater accountability of the local 
governments in the management of public resources, as well 
as a more efficient and effective administrative action, were 
introduced new systems of economic and management 
governance, typical of companies 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21, 22, 23.  
The introduction of such instruments oriented to an 
effective management required the adoption of complex 
reporting and performance measurements, in terms of 
accountability and management control 17, 24, 25,26. 
In order to support the decision making processes of local 
administrations through a proper information structure, we 
moved from a cash basis accounting system to an accrual basis 
accounting system, suitable for monitoring the economic, 
financial and capital effects of management action 24, 25, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31. 
In this new scenario, the survival of local public bodies 
depends largely on the management administrative abilities to 
maintain, over time, the conditions of economic and financial 
balance, essential to ensure the continuity and the autonomy of 
the public administration 32, 33, 34. 
The maintenance of the different equilibrium conditions 
requires, of course, that the management of the public body is 
able to conjugate the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
services offered (suggested value) with the users’ expectations 
and needs (recognized value) 14. 
The introduction of this cultural "revolution", inspired by 
the concept of "corporatization" and implemented in different 
ways in various EU countries, has led to a fiscal 
decentralization and to increased administrative autonomy 
35.  
Jointly to mentioned implemented change, and in order to 
rationalize public spending, in the EU area has been 
introduced the "stability pact" 36, 37, 38, 35 which 
resulted in progressive restrictions of state contributions and 
decentralization of many public functions 10, 39.  
The measures introduced, together with the inability of 
many local governments to direct the changes implemented, 
have, unfortunately, led to an impoverishment of the financial 
resources of local bodies and helped to produce, in severe 
cases, structural imbalances and even default situations 3. 
In Italy, this critical situation is unfolding in its whole 
severity, as evidenced by the 479 cases of financial ruin 
declared until May 2013, as well as by the 25 municipalities 
having their financial difficulty stated since 2012 until April 
2013 40.  
The Council of Europe, during the updating of the 
European Charter of Local Autonomies, established the 
principle of protection of the financially weakest local bodies, 
which must be supported through state funds for fiscal 
equalization (art. 9)  35. This provision has been transposed 
in Italy with the approval, in 2010, of the Charter of Local 
Autonomies. 
In doctrine, several studies have been made on this subject 
with the purpose of identifying the best mechanisms for the 
distribution of public resources to local governments 41, as it 
was assumed that any government intervention in support of 
the local governments in difficulty breaches the principle of 
autonomy and weakens the liability of public administrators 
42, 43, 44. 
It is clear that the decision for the intervention in favour of 
local bodies in critical situations is complex. The financial 
rescue of local governments in financial distress poses, indeed, 
a strategic dilemma, both for central government and for the 
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local bodies as well 45. So, if in a governmental context the 
decision for the extraordinary intervention and rescue clashes 
with the need to have real information on the financial 
condition of the local body in financial trouble 46, 47, it 
must be taken into account that the benefits that the local 
community gets from public intervention can be considered a 
special and individual interest, damaging the interests of the 
national community 48. 
Of course, at local level can be found two opposed needs, 
namely, on the one hand are required more state resources to 
fund public services without burdening local economies with 
more taxes; on the other hand, there is the claim for a greater 
decision-making autonomy favouring a better management 
efficiency. 
Local bodies are favourable to State support, though 
studies carried out on this matter show that where public 
intervention is operative, unsustainable and uncontrolled 
spending policies are encouraged 49, 50, 51. 
The negative effects produced on the national economy by 
the widespread and generalized state public interventions in 
support of local authorities in difficulty have been proven 
empirically, thanks to case studies in Norway, Sweden and 
Germany and reported as proof at the Council of Europe 37, 
46, 50, 52, 53, 54. 
Moreover, in these countries the institutionalization of 
extraordinary state funding in favour of local governments in 
financial trouble have prompted many municipalities, also not 
in difficulty, to declare a state of financial collapse, with 
serious consequences for the national economy. 
The improper use of state aid has ended up causing serious 
financial difficulties to such an extent that the same 
governments were forced to eliminate or limit the financial 
support measures. 
In most European countries, however, there are specific 
regulations concerning support to local bodies in financial 
difficulty and, in most cases, these actions are conditioned by 
the occurrence of certain conditions affecting local bodies to 
access the aid (p.37) 37. 
The parameters generally used to ascertain the financial 
condition of local bodies are linked to the ratio between debt 
and their own resources, or to the relationship between debt 
extent and working capital (p. 37) 37. 
Infrequent are the instructions about the methods for 
determining the contributions to be paid, the quantification of 
which is left, in most cases, to the discretion of the central 
government (p. 37) 37. 
Ultimately, Europe has welcomed the direction of the 
management autonomy of local bodies to manage their own 
financial difficulties, including administrative instability, 
although, there are exceptions, as demonstrated by the ad hoc 
interventions granted in favour of local bodies in financial 
difficulty using financing channels other than the specific ones 
(p. 37) 37. The issue in question, for its economic, political 
and social implications, is still open, as shown by the different 
solutions adopted by individual European States. 
 
III. THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF LOCAL BODIES IN ITALY 
(NOTES) 
 
The financial collapse of the Italian local bodies 
(Municipalities and Provinces) is a recent legal institution, 
currently ruled under Title VIII of the second part of the Testo 
Unico degli Enti Locali (Local Bodies Consolidated Act - 
TUEL), approved by Legislative Decree no. 267/2000, 
amended several times in relation to the needs and operational 
issues faced by the local bodies in financial troubles. 
Its introduction, due to the need to curb the growing 
phenomenon of off-balance liabilities and to limit the 
uncontrolled increase of public spending, has the declared 
objective of enabling local authorities in financial difficulties 
to ensure the performance of their institutional duties and the 
supply of key services in favour of the local communities 55. 
The various amendments done to the TUEL have made the 
insolvency proceedings similar to that of the bankruptcy, even 
though with deep differences. In the case of insolvency, in 
fact, though the need to protect the creditors of the local body 
is taken into consideration, priority is given, unlike what 
happens in the case of enterprises, to the need for 
administrative and operational continuity of the local body, 
notwithstanding its state of insolvency. 
In particular, the relevant legislation (art. 244 TUEL) 
imposes the obligation to declare the insolvency status at the 
occurrence of one of the following essential conditions: the 
inability to perform its own institutional duties; the inability to 
fulfil the payment obligations through the ordinary ways of 
restoring the rebalancing of the budget (Art. 193 TUEL), by 
including the off-balance liabilities as well (art. 194 TUEL). 
The function of the insolvency statement is that to create 
an administrative separation between the management before 
and after the collapse, by restoring the local body through the 
destination of credits and assets to the extinction of the debts. 
The local authority has the opportunity to start a new life 
without the previous financial and administrative indebtedness 
and with a rebalanced budget. In that situation, particular 
attention must be paid to the elimination of all the structural 
causes that led to the financial difficulties. 
Therefore, liabilities and assets, including residual 
unbounded assets and liabilities, are extracted from the 
municipal budget and transferred to the extraordinary 
management of the liquidation procedure, which is entrusted 
to a specific Extraordinary Liquidation Board (OSL), 
consisting of three members, in the case of municipalities 
having more than 5,000 inhabitants, and only of one member 
in the smallest municipalities. 
Under the technical-managerial aspect, financial recovery 
may follow three different and alternative processes: 
- Ordinary procedure; 
- Simplified procedure; 
- Extraordinary procedure. 
The "ordinary" procedure, governed by Articles 252, 253, 
254, 255, 256 and 257 of the TUEL, provides that the 
Liquidation Board, after assessment of the debts, upon request 
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of creditors, draws up a plan for the detection of all liabilities 
in order to arrange a repayment plan by which, through 
obtaining a mortgage financed by the State and at the expense 
of the same entity, the abnormal situation that caused the 
collapse is removed. 
Regarding the "simplified" procedure (Art. 258 TUEL), 
similar for some aspects to that of the composition with 
creditors, it allows to define the claims in a composition 
procedure by offering payment as settlement in an amount 
ranging from 40 to 60 per cent of the entire debt. 
In this case, once ascertained the total amount of liabilities 
and accepted the simplified liquidation procedure, the local 
body in financial trouble commits itself to make the necessary 
resources available to the creditors for the payment of debts 
for the amount agreed, except for the debts relating to the 
wages of the employees, which are paid in full. For disputed 
credits that are under legal action, there is the obligation to set 
aside the full amount for debt secured by privilege and half of 
the amount for those devoid  from such protection. 
This procedure presents relevant advantages since it allows 
on the one hand to the local body the realization of 
considerable savings and, on the other, to the creditors to get 
immediate liquidity. The adoption of the simplified procedure 
is certainly a valuable tool for the quick resolution of the 
financial crisis. Its adoption could be supported through a 
system of extraordinary contributions and other resources 
owned by the local body, useful to supply the body 
responsible of the management of financial collapse with the 
cash required to settle the claims amicably. 
The "extraordinary" procedure, in compliance with Art. 
268 bis and ter of the TUEL, is aimed to repair the financial 
collapse of the local body after the failure of the ordinary 
procedure for causes related to: inability to close the ordinary 
procedure successfully for the onerous obligations related to 
the process of assessment of assets and liabilities; inability of 
the local body to reach a real recovery; ascertainment of 
further administrative deficit and/or off-balance debts ex Art. 
268; lack of consistency of the active mass over liabilities. 
In this case, the financial recovery of the local body is 
achieved through the provision of financial resources in the 
annual budget, as extraordinary expenses, for an amount 
equivalent to the total passive mass. The amount of these 
provisions is defined in the multi-year financial engagement 
plans, which are subject to the approval by the Local Body 
Finance and Employee Commission and, subsequently, by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
The closure of the extraordinary procedure is conditioned 
by the drafting of the repayment plan that will attest to the 
rehabilitation work carried out. Otherwise, if it is not possible 
to extinguish liabilities, such liabilities return to burden the 
local body, with the consequent risk of incurring in the 
executive actions previously suspended.  
The peculiarity of the extraordinary procedure is that, 
unlike the ordinary procedure that considers only the resources 
existing at the time of the collapse management, under this 
procedure it is possible to include also future financial 
resources into the recovery plan. 
It is believed that the extraordinary procedure should be 
applied as a last solution for its excessive burdens as well as 
for the delay in the definition of the creditors’ expectations. 
Currently, regardless of the recovery procedure, following 
the approval of the Decree Law no. 159/2007, the resources 
needed for the management of the financial collapse are, in 
principle, charged to the local body in financial difficulty, that 
has the onerous task to find and allocate to the liquidation 
procedure the resources necessary for the payment of debts. 
The possible financial resources may result from: 
alienation of assets not strictly necessary for the performance 
of the local body’s institutional duties; increase to the 
maximum thresholds of tariffs, duties and local taxes, 
including property tax; reduction of expenses, including the 
costs for staff, if it is considered redundant according to 
average ratio of employees-population under art. 263 of the 
TUEL and lastly by the Ministerial Decree of 9 December 
2008; the surplus of the past five years starting from the 
collapse year; sums deriving from the possible reduction of a 
loan charged to the same local body. 
The ultimate intent of the norm on the financial collapse is 
that to make the achievement of the financial recovery as 
effective as possible. A goal that for a local body in distress 
necessarily means compression of its managerial autonomy 
and temporary sacrifice of its self-government powers in order 
to find a permanent balanced of budget. 
The legislation in question, despite the undeniable 
advantages for the central government and the entire national 
community, presents negative aspects for the individuals 
belonging to the local body in financial troubles, who undergo 
major local taxes and reduced government spending. 
 
IV. THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF 
TARANTO: CAUSES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
The financial collapse of the municipality of Taranto was 
declared by Commissioner’s decision no. 234 on 17th October 
2006, signed by the Special Commissioner, Dr Tommaso 
Blonda, who, after reviewing the balance sheet data, 
ascertained the impossibility to restore the budget balance, to 
ensure the ordinary management and the payment of maturing 
debts as well. 
The state of insolvency derived from the ascertained 
impossibility to face the regular payment, within end of 2006, 
of debts amounting to EUR 48 million, and primarily 
represented by advances received from the bank treasurer, 
securitization and instalments payment of mortgage and 
debenture loans. 
In the statement of financial collapse, the detected 
financial deficit amounted to a total figure of EUR 297 
million, largely due to operating deficits resulting from 
residual liabilities for EUR 137 million, deficit of accrual 
operation for EUR 103 million and off-budget debts for EUR 
116 million. 
The overall debt mass consisted mainly of: municipal 
bonds (Ordinary Municipal Bills - BOC) for about EUR 245 
million; debts for cash advances on a securitization of real 
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estate sales for EUR 25 million; passive mortgages worth a 
total of EUR 67 million; advances by the bank treasurer for 
approximately EUR 15 million. To these had to be added the 
further potential debt of about EUR 30 million resulting from 
the possible early termination of a contract of financial 
derivate. 
Against this debt situation, it was ascertained the absence 
of current assets and alienable real estate assets, in fact the 
latter consisted of properties and equity investments for a total 
of about EUR 60 million of the above is summarized in the 
table 1. 
Among the main causes that have produced insolvency 
there are, above all, the emergence of off-balance 
"uncontrolled" debts, as well as the high structural deficit of 
current assets, result of the significant incidence of 
compulsory non-deferrable expenditure, mainly represented 
by financial charges connected to the high level of bank 
indebtedness and to those arising from ongoing litigation for 
non-payment of commitments. 
A further critical element is represented by the existence of 
a current deficit, worsened over time even because of the 
absence of an effective action on the revenue collection and 
the renunciation to possible savings, which could have been 
obtained through new calls for tenders on public contracts 
expired from a long time. 
Other causes of instability were the failure to comply with 
the accounting standards, the unreliability of the accounting 
records, the presence of organizational inefficiencies of the 
administrative structure and the ineffectiveness of 
management control (see Commissioner resolution no. 
234/2006, signed by the Special Commissioner, Dr. Tommaso 
Blonda). 
TABLE I.  THE INITIAL COLLAPSE SITUATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY 
OF TARANTO 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Estimated real estate 
and financial assets  
59.967.113,24 Accrual deficit 103.325.930,30 
  
 
Deficit from residual 
assets and liabilities 
137.699.678,97 
  
 
Off-balance debts 
assessed by the date 
of the present report 
51.537.135,58 
  
 Off-balance debts 
under investigation 
for eligibility 
64.793.689,15 
  
Total assets (A) 59.967.113,24 Total liabilities (B) 357.356.434,00 
  
Budget deficit  
(B-A) 
297.389.320,76 
 
Source: Our elaboration on data taken from the Commissioner resolution no. 227 of 17 October 2006 
 
Following the statement of financial collapse, the 
management of the active and passive mass concerning the 
financial year 2006 and the previous ones, was entrusted, by 
order of the Central Government of 10 November 2006, to the 
Extraordinary Liquidation Board (OSL). In this way, the 
operation of the municipality in 2007 was only an ordinary 
operation, committed only to repay financial debts not expired 
by the end of 2006.  
In the first months of 2007, the OSL issued an invitation to 
apply for eligibility to the passive mass and drew up the 
detection plan of debts admitted to the passive mass as per art. 
254 of Legislative Decree no. 267/2000 (TUEL). 
Applications for eligibility were significantly higher than 
the liabilities initially assessed and precisely amounted to 
about EUR 531 million, represented by 5,001 timely 
applications, of which 603 without the appropriate 
certification of the claim, and over 152 submitted after the 
deadline expired on 10 April 2007 (see OSL resolution no. 45 
of October 1, 2007). 
Among the different procedures for managing the financial 
collapse, the OSL decided, in agreement with the 
municipality, to pay off the passive mass assessed through the 
"simplified" procedure under art. 258 of TUEL. 
This choice was justified especially for the quick time 
required for the recognition of debts, as well as its 
effectiveness, efficiency and cheapness in the management of 
the recovery procedure closure, compared to the ordinary one.  
In fact, the simplified procedure allows to carry out 
transactions with creditors of not less than 40% and not more 
than 60% of the assessed value of the debt (art. 258 of the 
TUEL). 
The resulting plan for the detection of the eligible debts, 
drawn up in the initial phase of the "simplified" procedure, 
involved an estimated financial commitment charged to the 
municipality of EUR 200.5 million. 
The relative financial provisions for the settlement of the 
ascertained passive mass were provided, partly by an 
extraordinary State contribution (granted pursuant to Decree 
Law no. 159/2007) of EUR 127.7 million, and partly by an 
expectation on collecting tax credits prior to 2006 for an 
amount of EUR 95 million as well as by the sale of municipal 
properties for an amount of EUR 40 million, as already 
envisaged by the resolution declaring the collapse.  
The resulting budget concerning the simplified recovery 
procedure appeared, therefore, as follows (Table 2). 
TABLE II.  BUDGET OF THE SEMPLIFIED PROCEDURE  
                                (DRAWN UP ON 1ST OCTOBER 2007) 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Extraordinary State 
Contribution 
(D.lgs 159/2007) 
127,700,000.00 Estimated debts 410,000,000 
Tax revenues previous 
to 2006 * 
95,000,000.00 
 
Properties  * 
(Commission 
resolution no. 
234/2006) 
40,000,000.00 
Liabilities to be 
funded 
(equal to 50% of the 
estimated debts) 
205,000,000 
Source: Our elaboration on data taken from Commissioner resolution no. 65/2007 
During the insolvency procedure, however, both the 
nominal value of the liabilities and the applications for 
admission continuously evolving because of the numerous 
applications submitted, over time, by individual creditors, as 
well as the continuous communication made by the same 
municipality for the recognition of debts relating to the period 
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prior to 31 December 2006 and, therefore, chargeable to the 
liquidation board. 
By reading the regular reports drawn up by the OSL, it was 
possible to ascertain the lack of separation between the 
applications submitted timely, in compliance with the 
invitation to apply for the admission to the procedure, and 
later ones, received after 10 April 2007. This anomaly may 
have generated irrational and unjustified treatments in the 
management of the transactions and settlement of the passive 
mass, resulting in discrimination of the credit positions, given 
the limited financial resources available. 
The number of applications submitted for the admission to 
the passive mass, on 9 October 2013, had increased from the 
initial 5,001 to 6,311. The instances admitted to the passive 
mass were 3,753, whereas 2,558 were rejected as not 
adequately documented. Furthermore, of the accepted 
applications, n. 2,897 defined their credit in the transaction 
and no. 856 rejected the settlement offer. The relative 
dynamics of eligible applications is represented in Table n. 3. 
With reference to the passive mass assessed by 4 June 
2013, the payments made for settlement of transactions 
accepted amounted to EUR 145 million, whereas the total 
value of the residual, unsettled debts amounted to about EUR 
299 million, of which: EUR 149.29 million related to 
transaction offers which had been rejected; EUR 149.79 
million were debts for which no settlement offer was made 
due to the lack of financial resources. The latter category of 
debts consisted of the Ordinary Municipal Bonds (BOC) for 
EUR 109.79 million and the residual trade debt for EUR 40 
million. The resulting situation of payments of the 
acknowledged liabilities was as described in table 4. 
The actual financial coverage of the settled passive mass 
derived, as defined by the forwarding plan, by the mentioned 
extraordinary state contribution which, upon conversion of the 
Legislative Decree no. 159/2007, amounted to EUR 130.5 
million.  
During the liquidation procedure, however, the OSL had to 
return to the central government part of the extraordinary 
contribution, amounting to EUR 33 million, as it had failed to 
use the whole amount awarded within the 31 December 2007. 
TABLE III.  NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE PASSIVE 
MASS  
A) Number of instances admitted (of which):                                                      
3.753 
- Number of settled instances 2.897 
- Number of unsettled instances because of rejected 
offer 
856 
B) Number of instances rejected                                                                           
2.558 
TOTAL NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR 
ADMISSION TO LIABILITIES (A+B)                                                                                        
                     
6.311
Source: Our elaboration on data updated to 9th October 201 3- OSL report no. XIV/2013 
In 2008, however, the State granted an additional 
extraordinary contribution of EUR 25.7 million, thus partly 
returning the contribution previously paid back and thus 
reducing the loss concerning the unused extraordinary State 
contribution to EUR 7.3 million (or EUR 33.0 million returned 
- EUR 25.7 million received). 
The possible causes of this loss concerning the State 
contribution were attributable to organizational and 
management inefficiencies of both the Extraordinary 
Liquidation Board that failed, with the means at its disposal, in 
compliance with terms established by the law, to examine the 
considerable number of instances of admission and to settle 
the eligible credits, both to the same municipal government 
that failed to effectively support, at the administrative level, 
the activity of assessment and verification of eligible claims. 
With reference to the residual liabilities to be settled, 
amounting to EUR 299.09 million the financial resources, 
available and set aside, awaiting to be delivered as per art. 
258, paragraph 4, of TUEL, amounted to EUR 75.30 million 
for debts unsettled because of rejected offer, corresponding to 
50% of the amount of each offer made and 100% of the offers 
made for unpaid wages and salaries (see OSL report no. XIV, 
2013). 
Differently, for the remaining outstanding debt position, 
i.e. the bond debt BOC of EUR 109.80 million and for the 
residual trade debts of EUR 40.00 million, despite more than 
nine years was spent since the liquidation procedure has 
started, no settlement offer has been made, as the Municipal 
Government failed to make available the necessary financial 
resources to the Extraordinary Liquidation Board. 
TABLE IV.  PAYMENTS OF LIABILITIES OF THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE   
Source: Our elaboration on data updated to 04th June 2013 (million eur) - OSL report no. XIV/2013 
At present, therefore, the forwarding plan for the 
extinction of the collapse, unless further changes arising from 
the investigations still ongoing and from the settlement offers 
made, has liabilities without financial coverage amounting to 
about EUR 223.80 million (table 5): 
TABLE V.  FORWARDING PLAN FOR SETTLEMENT OF RESIDUAL LIABILITIES 
FINANCIAL REVENUES  ASSESSED RESIDUAL DEBT 
Amounts set aside upon 
rejection of settlement 
offers (art. 258, par. 4, 
TUEL) 
75,297,481.51 
Debts for which 
settlement was 
rejected 
149,294,137.99 
  
Debts from 
residual municipal 
bonds BOC 
109,796,675.00 
  
Debts from 
residual trade 
credits 
40,000,000.00 
FINANCIAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
NEEDED FOR THE 
EXTINCTION OF 
RESIDUAL 
LIABILITIES  
223,793,331.48   
Source: Our elaboration on data taken from OSL report no. XIV of 04 June 2013. (Value in million eur) 
The lack of a financial coverage of EUR 223.80 million 
prevents the Extraordinary Liquidation Board from 
formulating further settlement offers on the remaining debt 
ascertained and does not allow to conclude the recovery 
procedure. 
A) Payments for settled debts                                                                              145.00 
 B) Acknowledged residual debt (of which) 299.09 
- Debt for which the settlement offer was rejected 149.29   
- Residual debt for municipal bonds BOC 109.80 
- Residual trade debts 40.00 
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The rules in force in Italy on financial collapse allow the 
OSL, if the municipal administration is unable to meet its 
financial commitments, to face the necessary financial 
requirements by resorting to the sale of real estate and 
movable property, as well as to the use of the unbounded 
operating surplus of the municipal administration. 
Other potential restructuring instruments recently 
introduced in Italy are represented by the access to the 
revolving fund and to the multiannual rebalance plan, under 
Articles 243 bis and following introduced by Law 213/2013, 
or else by the use of the opportunities offered by the Law 
35/2013, enjoying of the liquidity provided by the solidarity 
fund for local bodies constituted for the payment of debts 
accrued at 31 December 2012. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The European local public bodies, as a result of the Treaty 
of Maastricht 38, were affected by a gradual process of 
administrative decentralization, accompanied by significant 
cuts in government transfers, which led to the transition from a 
centralised public hierarchical system to one based on the 
principle of vertical subsidiarity 10, 39, 56. 
This decentralization process was experienced by local 
authorities, not without difficulty, so much so that many 
Municipalities found themselves in severe financial crises. 
On the issue of the possible consolidation strategies, the 
various European countries adopted contradictory policies that 
went from extraordinary state contributions to allowing an 
independent consolidation management. 
On this point, the doctrine is unanimous in highlighting 
that any state intervention in support of local bodies 
undermines their managerial autonomy and, at the same time, 
leads to a weakening of the principle of governance 
responsibility 45, 55, 57, 58. 
In Italy, the dilemma between State support and 
managerial autonomy has not been completely resolved, given 
that, despite the introduction of the financial collapse, 
conceived as an autonomous process of recovery, there have 
been state funds intended for that purpose. 
In order to contribute to the solution of the problem, the 
results of the present study were particularly significant and 
significant reflections can be derived. 
First of all, this analysis has showed how instability did not 
derive from exceptional situations, but was rather the result of 
an improper financial management having deep roots and 
caused by wrong strategic choices, critical situations inherited 
from the past, excess of cash advances, consistent off-balance 
debts. 
At present, the recovery procedure has not yet ended, 
given the lack of the financial resources needed to cover the 
remaining liabilities. The relevant financial needs, of EUR 
223.79 million, are likely to cause a "collapse within the 
collapse" of the local body. This demonstrates the inability of 
the local governance to manage the administrative recovery 
independently and promptly. 
The management inefficiencies of the insolvency 
procedure produced significant effects on the local economy, 
as demonstrated by the empirical analysis above that allowed 
to assess economic losses for approximately EUR 361.07 
million (of which EUR 109.3 million concerned the economic 
players residents and operating in the area in question). 
Of course, this situation influenced the economic and 
social balance of the local areas, as shown by the observation 
of the survival status of settled enterprises, of which about 
41% had (voluntarily or forcibly) ceased their economic 
activity. 
The survey results highlight the dangers related to the 
inability of the local body to plan and define the acquisition 
and the allocation of the resources necessary for its financial 
recovery. 
These problems, in our opinion, are due to the difficulty to 
manage simultaneously and to put on the same level the 
current needs that the Municipality must perform with the 
needs for recovery of the financial crisis. 
We believe, therefore, that the choice for an autonomous 
management of the insolvency procedure is correct, since it 
raises the governance responsibility toward a greater 
efficiency, but at the same time the legislation is not effective 
enough about the reorganization ways and the related timing. 
In order to limit the economic impact on local economies, 
a greater control on the respect of the forward plan for the 
coverage of the financial resources needed to extinguish the 
collapse procedure would be desirable.  
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